GIALLOROSSI YORKSHIRE BLOG
In the wake of an extremely embarrassing 4-1 defeat to Celta Vigo, something needs to change.
Regardless of the fact that it was a friendly, and that barely any of the starting eleven are expected to be starters when the season begins next week, going down 4-0 at half time is unacceptable. Yes, they may not have been Roma’s first choice players, but eight of them are capped at senior international level. That scoreline should never have been witnessed. Following the humiliating result, head coach Eusebio Di Francesco correctly accepted the blame for the defeat, saying “the responsibility always lies with the coach.” Indeed, while he arrived this summer with great promise, it appears he has a lot to learn when it comes to coaching a top level club. Tactically, there are two options you can take going into a pre-season. You can either set out with a desired formation and work heavily on it, or you can experiment and try out many different systems. Di Francesco opted for the former, always using the 4-3-3 system he favoured previously at Sassuolo. There are a number of flaws in his decision to do this. A trainer may have a favoured formation, one that they understand best, but they have to be able to fit their players to it. If they cannot, they should opt for the formation which best suits the available players. The 4-3-3 that Di Francesco likes to play, featuring inverted attacking wingers, is not the best option for some of Roma’s key players. Firstly, let’s look at two of last year’s best performers, Federico Fazio and Radja Nainggolan. Neither of them benefit from this system. Fazio performs better in a back three, whilst Nainggolan excelled in an attacking midfield role in a 4-2-3-1 last year. Now the Belgian is less free to join in the attacks like he did last season. The team should be built around its best players, but Di Francesco’s tactics so far have not brought the best out of these two. Another issue is Di Francesco’s reliance on having a left-footed, offensive right winger to cut inside and contribute to the team’s goal output. With this in mind, the loss of Mohamed Salah to Liverpool this summer was a massive blow, and the club haven’t yet been able to find a replacement for him. However, if Di Francesco selected a different formation, perhaps the Egyptian wouldn’t need to be replaced. For example, in parts of last season, Roma played a 3-4-2-1. The coach would be wise to consider using this formation again. It would allow Nainggolan to return to the attacking third, meaning only one space in that section of the pitch would be left vacant. This could easily be filled by a player already at the club, such as Diego Perotti or Stephan El Shaarawy. The competition between these two players for a starting spot is one of great debate between Roma fans. In my opinion, Perotti had a much better season than El Shaarawy in 2016/17, but he could be frozen out of the team in Di Francesco’s system. El Shaarawy is a much more natural fit for these tactics, despite Perotti possessing greater technical ability. Again, that means not getting the best out of your best players. That is simply illogical. Back to a 3-4-2-1 though, and Perotti would be comfortably suitable for the attacking midfield role alongside Nainggolan. El Shaarawy would also fit the position, and therefore the competition between the two would mean they would increase each other’s levels of performance, fighting for that starting spot. Cengiz Under would be another option there, meaning there would be plenty of depth for the area. Thus, more money could be spent on signing a new centre back, which is also currently an area of concern in this team. One defender at the club who also performs better in a back three is Juan Jesus. The left-sided centre back went through a great upturn in form last season, which coincided with the tactical switch to a 3-4-2-1 at the turn of the year. In a back four, he struggled, and there is reason to believe he could again. That would be very unfortunate for a player who I chose as Roma’s most improved player last season. Next, Edin Dzeko scored 16 goals in games in which Roma started with a 3-4-2-1 last season, more than he scored in the entirety of his first season in Rome – half of which was played under a coach who used a 4-3-3. After being the league’s top scorer last year, no one would want to see Dzeko struggle in front of goal again – but he did in a similar system two years ago. He scored two goals this pre-season for Roma; it will be interesting to see how his season goes. He should feel confident after last year, but we will have to see how this system serves him. Lorenzo Pellegrini may also benefit from a 3-4-2-1. Whilst he has played under Di Francesco for the past two years and understands the movements his coach wants him to make as part of a midfield three, he could also do well in a central midfield duo. This year, he made his senior Italy debut alongside fellow Roman Daniele De Rossi, and they were the only two central midfielders used by Gian Piero Ventura. Playing a 3-4-2-1 could allow De Rossi and Pellegrini to develop this partnership further (when the latter is on the pitch), and would also help the young midfielder grow. There are crossover elements between the 3-4-2-1 I am suggesting and Di Francesco’s system. Both incorporate attacking full backs, needed to create width, something that EDF has understood and used throughout his coaching career. This would be good for the likes of Bruno Peres and Rick Karsdorp, who are both full backs who like to attack. The extra protection at the back would afford them even more freedom than the current system, and they could contribute a lot going forwards. Di Francesco is a professional, and Roma fans should trust his judgement and ability. But a top coach needs to have several different formations at their disposal for their team to be competitive. And if things carry on like they did yesterday, EDF will need to think long and hard about whether he can use his preferred system at his new club. At the minute, it won’t work unless Roma invest in a top quality centre back and an equally good right winger, which would strain the club financially. Switch to a 3-4-2-1, and one of those problems is immediately solved, meaning the other could be sorted more easily. For every problem, there is a solution, and this shape may be the answer to Di Francesco’s problems if they continue. Suggested Roma line up using a 3-4-2-1 (with all players fully fit): Alisson; Manolas, Fazio, Jesus/Kolarov (or a new CB); Karsdorp, De Rossi, Strootman, Emerson; Nainggolan, Perotti/Florenzi; Dzeko
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Whilst many names have been linked with Roma over the last few days to become the team's new right winger, the solution for this position may well be hiding right in plain sight. There is reason to believe that Roma's right winger next season is already at the club.
In Eusebio Di Francesco's first press conference as Roma head coach, he may have dropped a little hint about a player he intends to use in that position, that many may not have noticed. "Nainggolan can easily score 18 goals a season playing as an attacking midfielder and he's perfectly capable of starting in a slightly wider position." Radja Nainggolan has just completed the season of his life with Roma, in which he added significant goal output to his energy and dynamism. He has played in a 4-3-3 before, as a midfielder under Rudi Garcia, but may be utilised in the front three next season. It was a slight change in position that helped him achieve his commendable goal tally last season, as he ventured higher up the pitch to become an attacking midfielder in Spalletti's 4-2-3-1 system, a role similar to one he had played in earlier in his career at Cagliari. He showed through this system that he is a player who likes to get forward, and likes to score goals in the process. His work rate also benefited the team higher up the pitch. So, he may be in line to stay in an advanced role next season; this time, as a wide forward. Although he is far from a natural winger, he may just have the qualities to fit Di Francesco's requirements for that position. Often, EDF's wingers are encouraged to pick up pockets of space left in the middle of the park, drifting inside to create combination play in the attacking third. They do not go to the byline and look to make a cross, but instead come inside and help link the team's attack. It is in similar pockets of space that Radja found joy last season, roaming around the final third to pick up the ball and continue the team's attack with either a dangerous shot or an important pass. There is no reason why he couldn't do the same next season, albeit from a different starting position. Although Di Francesco's wide men are usually inverted, preferring to use the opposite foot to the side on which they play, Radja Nainggolan is an intelligent enough footballer to adapt to whichever side of the pitch his coach may have in mind for him. He will have to engage with the team's build up play in order to ensure he receives the ball comfortably, thinking about his body position when acquiring possession, and about what the easiest route towards goal for him is. As he plays small passes with his fellow forwards, he will have to make intelligent runs off the ball, which is an area of his game that is already very good. As this occurs, he may well find himself in a similar position to the one he played in last season, facing goal in the vicinity of the centre of the attacking third. From there, he will be able to make the same contributions as he did in 2016/17. Spots in Roma's midfield three next season are likely to be taken by Daniele De Rossi, Kevin Strootman and the imminently returning Lorenzo Pellegrini, meaning last year's player of the season Nainggolan may find more minutes in this inside forward position. Of course, the Belgian international will be one of the first names on Di Francesco's team sheet, but for this to be achieved, he may have to be deployed in a new area of the pitch. Given the way he effortlessly became an attacking midfielder in the season just gone, there is enough evidence to suggest that Nainggolan will be able to adapt to this new role; and, as he did in 2016/17, make his new position his own. Well that was horrible. The final Derby of the season saw Roma outsmarted, outpaced, outwitted. There's now a long wait until next season to prove ourselves again as the best club in the capital. How could it have gone so wrong?
Lazio set up using the same 3-5-2 formation they had played against Roma in the Coppa Italia semi final clashes in March and April, although it was more resemblant of a 3-5-1-1. Roma opted for the 4-2-3-1 shape that has been reasonably successful of late. The game didn't actually start badly for Roma. For the first eight or so minutes, i Lupi had the upper hand in terms of possession and the creation of chances. Edin Džeko wasted a good chance early on, albeit due to a good save from Lazio goalkeeper Strakosha. However, as the clock turned to the 10 minute mark, the game began to turn in Lazio's favour. Roma's defence seemed to lack organisation and good reading of the game. Too many times in the first half, Lazio found Keita Baldé with huge expanses of space to attack. Keita's pace appeared problematic for Roma's centre back partnership of Kostas Manolas and Federico Fazio. Fazio especially looked in difficulty with the pace offered by the Lazio attack. Despite being a reliable rock at the back this season, picking up the nickname Il Comandante along the way, he was noticeably off the pace, and nearly gave away a penalty when he brought Lazio full back Jordan Lukaku down in the box. Maybe this game showed that Fazio is more comfortable in the middle of a back three than in a back four. He looked extremely, and unusually, vulnerable. However, it is far from reasonable to single out only Fazio as having a bad performance. As stated, Džeko missed a good chance early on, which set the tone for the rest of the game. He barely got a sniff in front of goal over the 90 minutes. In addition, star man Radja Nainggolan went by quietly in a game he would have been expected to perform in, as he has done in other big games this year. Tactically, on Roma's part, perhaps the two full backs played slightly too high up the pitch. (Given Roma were using inverted wingers, the full backs had to do this to create width in attack). The defence looked stretched as a result of this, and this is what allowed Keita to find so much joy - and Manolas and Fazio so much despair. The gaps between the defence and the midfield were also huge, even Daniele De Rossi foraging too far forward in the match. In contrast, Simone Inzaghi's tactic to deploy Lazio's three central midfielders very deep, almost in touching distance of their three centre backs, limited the space that Roma's equally quick and dangerous attackers could find. Hence, chances of any meaning were limited, causing Roma's midfield to (naïvely) push higher in search of a breakthrough, leaving the defence unprotected. A couple of counter attacks from Lazio, and the damage was done. Lazio's resolute defending was certainly problematic for Roma's attack, and the Giallorossi quickly ran out of ideas. With Lazio playing wing backs, it would have been expected to see Roma exploiting the width left in behind Dusan Basta and Lukaku. Mohamed Salah did indeed see a lot of the ball in the first half and was definitely Roma's best player on the day. However, as the game went on, Lazio's wing backs dropped deeper and deeper, cutting off the space in which the Egyptian was finding some joy, and formed something closer to a back five. This tactic had been used by the Biancocelesti in the two legs of the Coppa Italia clash, so it is surprising that Roma were unable to find a way around it. The tactic to sit deep and cut off the spaces for Roma's threatening attack by packing the midfield and defence was nothing new, yet Roma couldn't adapt. Roma's only goal came not from great play, but from an inexcusable dive from Kevin Strootman, who will have to take a long look at himself in the mirror after that. It has put a dampener on what has been a fantastic season for the Dutchman. If there was a game this season that sealed Luciano Spalletti's fate, it was this one. His self-imposed, hypercritical high standards have not been met, and to lose two derbies in a season is frankly not good enough. His constant refusal to talk about his future may be having an impact on the team's play and mental focus, and the negativity caused by his uncertainty is not what an ambitious club like Roma needs. His players may not have performed for him on Sunday, but he seemed to have run out of ideas by the end of the game. The switch to a back three at half time was the right decision, but it looked uncharacteristically disorganised and was quickly abandoned. By the end of the game, all three substitutes used, he seemed to have forgotten how to lead a team to a Derby victory. Roma should have been incredibly motivated to win this game after the disappointment of being eliminated from the Coppa. Those demons were not vanquished, and the team will have to live with the effects of this defeat for a while. Second place still looks possible, but Napoli's fantastic recent form has put them just a point behind, with a potentially easier run in as well. It would be a good achievement to come second, but Roma simply must do better in derbies next season. Because no Roma fan wants to see anything as shambolic as Sunday's pathetic performance against our most bitter rivals ever again. |
samuel bannister
Founder and editor of Giallorossi Yorkshire, who is also a columnist for Roma's official website about the women's team. Categories
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